Salvini's Record on Border Tightening and Relocation

 

Jürg Martin Gabriel

Prof. Emeritus ETHZ

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology

Zurich, Switzerland

 

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3402861

 

 June 2019

 

Introduction

Matteo Salvini is a flamboyant Italian politician known to pursue a number of controversial policies. As is typical of many national-populists, his favorite target is the European Union.[1] It showed during his first year in office, when the focus was primarily on migration. His objective was to tighten the maritime borders of Italy and, in so doing, to force other EU states to participate in migrant relocation – something Brussels had failed to do.  

 

In part Salvini was successful. Blue-border arrivals decreased substantially, and a fair number of relocations took place. However, and as I will show, the actions were accompanied by shortcomings and problems. It is true that the pressure on Brussels increased, but the EU's migration policy did not improve. And, although Salvini's actions were popular at home and in some EU countries, he also made a lot of enemies.

 

The present article covers Salvini's first year as Minister of the Interior, the period from June 2018 to June 2019. Given the results of the recent EU Parliamentary elections, where his party did well, Salvini is likely to stay in office for some time. But the political landscape is bound to change. In Brussels he will face a different group of actors, and at home he may have to form a new coalition.[2] The future is anything but certain.

 

The present article has four parts. It begins with a brief look at the past, with the situation Salvini inherited from his predecessor, Marco Minniti of the Democratic Gentiloni government.[3] Part Two is a look at Salvini's most important operations during his first year in office. Part Three deals with a number of special aspects and problems highlighting, among other things, the difficult position of Malta. The article ends with an evaluation of Salvini's overall performance and with a table listing the many SAR operations he confronted.   

 

Italy's Past Performance

Italy has one of the longest external borders in the European Union and, to make matters worse, it is a maritime border that is difficult to control. For years, Italy has had to deal with a heavy flow of migrants crossing the Central Mediterranean.[4] Small wonder the country has felt the negative consequences of the Dublin First Country rule more than many of its EU neighbors.[5] In the years 2014, 2015, and 2016 there were between 150,000 to 180,000 arrivals annually.

 

Italy's handling of migration is ambivalent; it has a positive and a negative side.[6] Given the impressive search and rescue (SAR) assets at its disposal, the country's maritime performance has to this day been respectable. This was particularly true of operation 'Mare Nostrum' organized after the tragic accidents off Lampedusa in late 2013.[7] On land, however, the reality was different. Many of the camps were poorly run, and most important, there was no systematic registration. Numerous migrants, taking advantage of the situation, moved to neighboring countries like France, Switzerland, and Austria, although many also went to Germany and Great Britain. The result was what is known as secondary migration and, tied to it, an informal practice of relocation.

 

Realizing the administrative shortcomings, the EU helped with the installation of so-called 'hotspots' — with limited effect. The Italian government, too, tried to get a better grip on the situation. The most notable efforts were launched by Minniti. The focus was at sea rather than on land.[8]

 

Minniti launched a number of measures, some of which foreshadowed Salvini's initiatives. One of his first actions was to improve the state of the Libyan Coast Guard. The effort is surrounded by secrecy, and we know very little about it. Already under Gadaffi the Libyan navy was poorly run, and given Libya's present chaos, the situation has hardly improved. Reports about Libyan SAR efforts must be treated with caution.[9]     

 

Another Minniti idea was to introduce new rules governing SAR operations, including the use of Italian ports. The program was initiated after the Democrats suffered heavy losses in the local elections of June 2017. On July 17, and as a first step, Minniti published a 12-point ‘Code of Conduct’ regulating non-governmental SAR activities.[10] The primary purpose was to limit the pull-effect produced by the numerous NGO rescue vessels that, after the Lampedusa accidents, had begun to operate between Italy and Libya. Most NGOs saw the rules as an effort to limit their freedom of action and objected. Eventually, however, they agreed to play by the new rules.

  

Two related Minniti initiatives dealt with Italian ports. On June 28, 2017, Rome asked the EU to close Italian ports to ships ‘not flying Italian flags,’ a step meant to affect different types of vessels but once more aimed mainly at NGOs. The Brussels reply was negative, and the idea was shelved.   

 

A similar initiative aimed at Frontex, the EU's Border and Coast Guard Agency.[11] In late 2017, the Gentiloni government tried to influence the wording of the mandate planned to govern Operation ‘Themis.’ Italian ports, so the language proposed, were no longer to function as the sole locations of EU disembarkation, as had been the case during the preceding Operation ‘Triton.’[12] From now on, to ease the Italian burden, migrants could be taken to any other EU port in the Mediterranean. Indirectly the formulation would have affected the Dublin regulation, but once again, Brussels objected, and Frontex vessels continued to land in Italy.

 

Salvini's Major Operations

Salvini took office on June 2, 2018, and ordered immediate action. Unlike Minniti he neither consulted Brussels nor waited for a reply. His strategy was unilateral. As a first measure, he declared that Italian ports were closed to NGO vessels. This rather dramatic step was widely criticized as impractical and inhuman. At home, however, the declaration met with considerable approval. As said, for years Italy had experienced the negative consequences of EU migration policy, more precisely the combined effects of a permeable external EU border, the Dublin regulation, and the embarrassing relocation failure. Salvini targeted all three problems – with certain results.

 

As the table at the end of this paper shows, during his first year in office Salvini faced around 60 maritime operations and managed to gain control over nearly 20. Let us look at some of the major cases more closely.   

 

Salvini's first intervention was quite spectacular. An NGO boat and three merchant ships were involved, and after a week 629 migrants went ashore in Valencia. Two Mediterranean countries, France and Spain, were willing to participate in the first relocation of this kind. The NGO vessel involved was the Aquarius run by SOS Méditerranée and supported by Médecins sans Frontières, two heavyweights among the dozen or so NGOs.[13] To manage the long journey of so many migrants, Italy was willing to help. A number of migrants were transferred to two boats of the Guardia Costiera. For an entire week the operation made world headlines. Salvini must have been pleased.

 

A second major event occurred hardly a week later, when 234 migrants were rescued by the German NGO Mission Lifeline.[14] After some awkward days at sea, their boat was allowed to dock at the Maltese harbor of Valletta - but only after eight EU countries agreed to accept the migrants. The relocation effect, once more, was rather impressive.

 

Toward the end of June, there was a third and somewhat smaller operation. The Catalan Proactiva Open Arms rescued 59 migrants with disembarkation at Barcelona, the boat's home port.[15] Looked at as a whole, the month of June was an impressive start. Salvini imposed his will on three major NGOs. 

 

In the middle of July, 450 migrants were rescued by two governmental ships, the British Protector operating for Frontex and a vessel of the Guardia di Finanza. Since no NGO was involved, Salvini was ready to compromise. The migrants were allowed to disembark in the Sicilian port of Pozzallo. It meant that, for the moment at least, Italian ports remained open for public vessels – but only when tied to relocation. Six EU countries had agreed to accept around 50 migrants each. Italy cooperated by taking some migrants as well. 

 

A month later, in the middle of August, two events occurred at practically the same time. Aquarius of SOS Méditerranée rescued 141 migrants and Malta's Maritime Squadron 114.[16] In both cases disembarkation occurred at Valletta, but once again, only after five EU countries agreed to participate in relocation, including the Italians and the Maltese. 

 

The situation changed after the middle of August. Of the 21 operations that took place up to late December, only two ended with relocations, one by an NGO, another by the Guardia Costiera. As in previous years, hundreds of migrants landed and remained in Italy and Malta. And, also as usual, there were various surprise landings. NGO vessels were almost totally absent — a fact that is difficult to explain. In part it could be a reaction to Salvini's actions, but as is typical for that time of the year, changing weather conditions might also have played a role.     

 

Regular NGO involvement restarted toward the end of the year 2018. There were two major operations between December 21 and January 9. First, Proactiva Open Arms rescued 308 migrants and took them all the way to Algeciras in Spain. Then the German NGOs Sea Watch and Sea Eye rescued 49 migrants and unloaded them at Valletta after seven EU countries agreed to participate in relocation,[17] once more with the participation of Italy and Malta.

The first six months of 2019 were once again relatively quiet. There were only four SAR interventions that ended in relocation. Two NGOs disembarked their migrants in Catania and Valletta, with relocation in six different EU countries. The Italian navy's Cigala Fulgosi was involved in two additional operations that also ended in various relocations.  

 

Problems and Solutions

So much for some of the more important operations that, in general, followed Salvini's logic. Let us next look at a number of situations that were more special. Malta is an example. The country was regularly affected by Salvini's actions, directly or indirectly. Initially, as is to be expected, Salvini pursued a conflictual course toward the island republic. He proclaimed that Malta failed to do its job – to the disadvantage of Italy. The accusation was anything but new.

 

The problem, in many cases, was the Italian island of Lampedusa, located in the huge Maltese SAR zone inherited from the British and stretching from Libya to Italy.  When accidents occurred in this area, Salvini, like many of his predecessors, argued that Malta was responsible for rescue, disembarkation and, if possible, also for relocation. He was wrong. The international Law of the Sea states clearly that within its zone a country is primarily responsible for SAR coordination. Rescues have to be conducted by ships closest to the accident, and disembarkations have to take place in the nearest safe port – which in many cases happens to be Lampedusa rather than Malta.

 

No wonder Malta often refused to comply with Salvini's demand, and on top of that, copied him by also closing its ports. But only for a while. Already towards the end of June 2018, the country was ready to permit disembarkations at Valletta – tied to the willingness of seven EU countries to participate in relocation. There were more than a dozen such instances by the end of June 2019.

 

Interviews with Maltese officials show that quiet diplomacy was at work. Prior to a disembarkation, Malta would contact the EU Commission and demand the mobilization of countries willing to participate in relocation. In many cases Brussels was successful. The effort was informal and anything but ideal, but it usually worked.   

 

Other situations were more difficult to handle, and at times there was no solution at all. This was true for surprise arrivals. Throughout the 12 months, over 300 migrants continued to land directly on the beaches of Lampedusa, Sicily, and Calabria.

 

Problems also arose when, besides NGO vessels, other types of ships participated in SAR operations. Vessels of the Italian navy, the Guardia Costiera, and the Guardia di Finanza were regularly involved, joined at times by oil tankers and merchant ships. At other times, the Maltese Maritime Squadron and vessels operating on behalf of Frontex or EUNAVFOR intervened.[18]  

 

Treating the various ships alike was impossible. To block Italian ports to NGO boats was one thing; to close them for governmental vessels was another. Two cases were typical. In early June 2018 the Guardia Costiera's Diciotti rescued a total of 1,441 migrants with disembarkation in two Sicilian harbors. The same was true in July when the Irish warship Samuel Beckett, participating in EU mission Sophia, was involved.[19] In both cases disembarkation was in Sicilian ports – without relocation.

 

The situation could also be difficult when governmental and non-governmental vessels joined forces. The first two operations of June 2018 are a case in point. The 1,086 migrants involved were rescued by three different NGOs, two boats of the Guardia Costiera, and three merchant ships. In one case relocation failed; in the other it worked. It also functioned in May 2019, when 66 migrants were rescued by the Italian Navy's Cigala Fulgosi and an Italian NGO vessel. The migrants went on land at Lampedusa and Augusta after four EU countries were willing to accept them.

 

Merchant ships and fishing trawlers were an additional problem. Sicilian fishermen could not be expected to organize relocations. And how would Salvini explain to an international shipping company that the arrival of hundreds of containers at Rotterdam would be delayed for days? During the 12-month period, 10 merchant ships and three fishing boats were involved. Relocation was possible in only one case.

 

Conclusions

Salvini's strategy was political, and a final assessment, therefore, has to be political as well. But let me begin with a summary of important facts. Figures published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) show that the number of Italy arrivals during Salvini's first six months in office was down to around 3,000. For the second six months, the figure lies in the vicinity of 1,600. Salvini's primary aim, the tightening of Italy's blue border, had no doubt been achieved.[20]  

 

Salvini obviously succeeded in enforcing relocations. Around 2,600 migrants were taken in by other countries. It is a respectable number, although Salvini might have expected more. Relocations were part of 17 known operations tied to around 50 disembarkations. At least nine different EU and two non-EU states were involved. France, we are told, participated in nine cases, Spain in eight, and Germany and Portugal in seven each. A handful of other countries were less active. Luxembourg took part in five disembarkations, Ireland in four, the Netherlands and Romania in two, and Belgium in one. The two non-EU countries Norway and Albania participated in one disembarkation each.   

 

Another Salvini aim was to stop NGO activities – and in some ways, he did. As the table below shows, the Catalan Open Arms and the German Sea Watch were involved in only four operations. Two others, the French/German SOS Méditerranée and the German Sea Eye were limited to three rescues each. And, as said, Salvini's ability to control governmental ships, whether Italian, Maltese, or European, was worse.  

 

It is also true that of the roughly 60 operations Salvini confronted, he managed to control no more than 17. Add to this the fact that in the early period he was more successful than later on. During the first three months there were eight relocations involving 1,717 migrants; during the remaining nine months there were less than 900.  

 

The decrease, as Salvini sees it, is proof of his success, but we do not know for sure. Other explanations are possible. As mentioned, changing weather conditions can play a role, and so might the activities of the Libyan Coast Guard. Another factor is modern means of communication that, as we know, helped to shift the migrant flow to Morocco and Spain.

 

Let me end with a word about politics. The harshest criticism comes mainly from NGOs and human rights organizations. NGOs see Salvini's actions as ill-conceived and in conflict with international law and practice. Human rights organizations consider it as inhuman, as making crossings more dangerous and raising the number of victims.

 

It is also true that Salvini’s unilateralism served the Italian rather than the wider European interest. For many observers and commentators, the effect was disintegrative and created more problems than it solved. They see the behavior of the Visegrad group and the partial reintroduction of national border controls as ample proof.

 

But critics tend to overlook the informal side of things. The performance of Malta is a case in point. Brussels, under indirect pressure, was forced to get involved, and a fair number of EU states cooperated. It is entirely possible that the experience might have a positive effect in future EU discussions on migration and the Dublin regulation. 

 

 

 

Salvini Record June - December 2018

Date	Ships involved		Mi-grants	Disembarkation	Relocation
9./10.6.18	NGOs & GC 'Sea Watch 3' & Sea Eye 'Seefuchs' & GC 'Diciotti'		457	Malta refusal Reggio (Sea Watch) Pozzallo (GC & Seefuchs)	none
10./17.6.	NGO, GC, Merchant SOS Méd ‘Aquarius’ GC & 3 merchant ships		629	Valencia 'Aquarius' & 2 It. GC Malta refusal	Spain France    629 - 1
13.6.	GC 'Diciotti' rescue		932	Catania (Sicily)	none
20.6.	GC 'Diciotti' rescue		509	Pozzallo (Sicily)	none
21./26.6.	NGO German Mission ‘Lifeline’ (Dutch flag)		234	Valletta Vessel impounded	France, Portugal, Holland, Lux., Belgium, Ireland, Norway & Italy  863 - 2
23./26.6.	Merchant Danish container ship		113	Pozzallo (Sicily)	none
30.6./4.7.	NGO Catalan ‘Open Arms’		59	Barcelona	Spain 922 - 3
6.7.	GC Pakistanis, sailing boat		59	Augusta (Sicily)	none
8.7.	Sophia Irish navy ‘Samuel Beckett’		106	Messina (Sicily)	none
10.7.	Oil Rig Tug & GC Rescue by ‘Vos Thalassa’		67	Trapani (Sicily) transfer to 'Diciotti'	none
14./16.7.		Frontex & GdF Dinghy rescue by GdF & Themis ‘Protector’ (GB)	450	Pozzallo (Sicily) Malta-Italy dispute	50 to Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Ireland & Malta, Rest to Italy   1372 - 4

 

15./21.7.	NGO Catalan ‘Open Arms’	1 rescued 2 dead	Palma de Mallorca Libya CG 165	Spain   1375 - 5
18.7./1.8.	Merchant Tunisian ‘Sarost 5’	40	Zarzis /Tunisia Malta & Italy refusal	none
19./20.7.	GC & GdF Wooden dinghy	60	Trapani (Sicily)	none
2./9.8.	NGO    Catalan ‘Open Arms’	87	Algeciras	Spain   1462 - 6
10./14.8.	NGO SOS Méd ‘Aquarius’	141	Valletta	Germany, France, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, Italy & Malta     1717 - 7/8
13./14.8.	AFM Sinking dinghy	114	Valletta
13.8.	GC Tunisians, out of fuel	15	Lampedusa	none
15.8.	AFM Migrant dinghy, near Malta	35	Valletta	none
16./26.8.	GC 'Diciotti' resc., Malta coord.	177	Catania (Sicily)	Ireland, Albania & Italy 1894 - 9
18.8.	AFM Damaged dinghy, off Malta	61	Valletta	uncertain Salvini involvement
22.8.	AFM Leaking dinghy	100	Valletta	uncertain Salvini involvement
22.8.	GC Pakistanis from Turkey	56	Crotone (Calabria)	none
23.8.	Port Authority, GdF Sailing boat	34	Santa Maria di Leuca (Apulia)	none
31.8.	GdF    Algerians	7	Sardinia	none

 

1.9.	GC, Carabinieri Six different boats	66	Lampedusa	none
14.9.	Surprise landing Tunisians	184	Lampedusa	air repatriation ?
17.9.	Surprise landing Tunisians	5	Agrigento	none
20./30.9.	NGO SOS Méd 'Aquarius 2'	58	Valletta	Germany, France, Portugal, Spain   1952 - 10
8.10.	AFM Close to Maltese coast	220	Valletta	none
13.10.	Port Authority Malta-Italy dispute	70	Lampedusa	none
17.10.	Merchant 'Just Fitz III'	44	Valletta	none
6.11.	AFM Packed dinghy, off Malta	149	Valletta	none
10.11.	Surprise landing Salvini claims Malta 'help'	13	Lampedusa	none
14.11.	Fishing boat rescue	40	Lampedusa	none
23.11.	GdF Rescue	68	Lampedusa	none
25.11.	Fishing boat Salvini claims Malta 'help'	264	Pozzallo	none
2.12.	Spanish Fishing boat AFM rescue	11	Valletta	none
21./29.12.	NGO Catalan 'Open Arms'	308	Algeciras	Spain   2260 - 11

 

22.12./9.1.	NGO 'Sea Watch 3'	32	Valletta	Germany, France, Portugal, Ireland, Romania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Italy, plus 249 from Malta   2309 - 12/13
29.12./9.1.	NGO Sea Eye 'Albrecht Penck'	17	Valletta
30.12.18	AFM Drifting dinghy, off Malta	69	Valletta	none

 

January – June 2019

10.1.19	Surprise landing	51	Calabria beach	none
19./30.1.	NGO 'Sea-Watch 3'	47	Catania	Germany, France, Portugal, Romania, Malta    2356 - 14
19.1.	Surprise landing	13	Lampedusa	none
21./22.1.	Merchant ship 'Lady Sham'	144	Misrata (Libya)	none
5./6.3.	AFM GC trouble off Lampedusa	87	Valletta Rome call	none
25./26.3.	Surprise landing Two small boats	39	Lampedusa	none
27./28.3.	Tanker 'Hijacked' by migrants	108	Valletta	uncertain Salvini involvement
3.4.	Surprise landing On Sardinia beach	8	Sardinia	none
3./13.4.	NGO Sea Eye 'Alan Kurdi' EU & Salvini involved	64	Valletta	France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal   2420 - 15
11.4.	GdF Intercepts boat	90	Lampedusa	none

 

9./10.5.	Italian Navy & NGO 'Cigala Fulgosi' Mare Sicuro  & 'Mare Jonio'	66	36 Augusta 30 Lampedusa	France, Malta, Germany, Luxembourg   2486 - 16
10.5.	AFM Rescue off Malta	85	Valletta	none
15./19.5.	NGO ‘Sea Watch 3’	61	Lampedusa	none
25./26.5.	AFM Two rubber dinghies	216	Valletta	uncertain
25.5.	GdF Pakistani migrants	54	Crotone	none
29.5.	AFM drifting on tuna pen	75	Valletta	uncertain
30.5./1.6.	Italian Navy 'Cigala Fulgosi'	100	Genoa	Salvini: Relocation in 5 EU countries   2586 - 17